The religious revival that followed the collapse of the USSR provides an excellent opportunity to compare the dynamics of projects of religious freedom with those of religious repression. Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, this article documents the contradictory effects that both repressive and liberal policies and laws have on religious expression. Thus, while Soviet anti-religious policies undeniably caused much suffering and hardship, religious repression also contributed to an intensification of religious experience among certain Muslim and evangelical groups. And while religious freedom laws expanded the scope for public religious organization and expression, they also produced new inequalities between religious groups, as the cases of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate. Ultimately, the article shows that the effects of liberal and repressive laws are far from straightforward and need to be analyzed in relation to the social context in which they are applied.
Introduction
Consider an imam in Ajara (Georgia) who longs for the Soviet period when religion was repressed; imagine a state functionary in Kyrgyzstan who complains about the unfairness of religious freedom. How to explain such nostalgia for religious repression expressed by the practitioners of a formerly repressed faith? What does "religious freedom" look like when the law itself is fragile? This article looks to post-Soviet examples to reveal contradictions in regimes of religious freedom and repression. In considering the unintended consequences of religious freedom, it also draws attention to how laws about religion relate to the exercise of other forms of power in situations of social and political turmoil and transition.
Recent scholarship on the subject of religious freedom has revealed how the Christian and liberal roots of the modern categories of "religion" and "freedom" have contributed to the emergence of a "political doctrine of freedom" that affects religious groups in multiple ways. 1 For one, it requires religious groups to disentangle religious and non-religious aspects of life.
2 This is so because "religious freedom" projects tend to equate religion with interiorized belief, which restricts and shapes the ways in which religion enters the public sphere. 3 Moreover, the Western construction of freedom rests on a semiotic ideology that underwrites the "autonomy supposed of a free agent" and is based on a separation of language from action that reflects a Protestant bias, but is incongruous with the semiotic ideologies of many other religious traditions. 4 The post-Soviet liberalizations of the religious sphere have similarly shown that "freedom" affects religious groups in many ways, producing not only opportunities but also new constraints, and creating new inequalities. By tracing the (sometimes contradictory) effects of post-Soviet liberalization, this essay contributes to the critical discussion of "religious freedom." However, it argues that this discussion needs to be complemented by 1 See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Believing in Religious Freedom," The Immanent Frame (blog), March 1, 2012, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/03/01/believing-in-religious-freedom/; Courtney Bender, "The Power of Pluralist Thinking," The Immanent Frame (blog), April 11, 2012 , http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/11/the-power-ofpluralist-thinking/. 2 For a concise discussion of this issue, see Bender, "The Power of Pluralist Thinking." 3 Talal Asad suggests that affording people "the right to choose their religious beliefs" is in a secular world "everything that the modern state can afford to let go": Asad, attention to its opposites: "religious unfreedom" or, applied to the politico-legal domain, "religious repression." Such an effort will add a sense of grounding to discussions of freedom, and draw attention to the fact that not only "religious freedom projects" but also "religious repression projects" are characterized by multiple contradictions.
The post-Soviet world offers a useful case precisely because it allows us to study religious freedom and repression together. The collapse of the USSR marked the end of seventy years of anti-religious policies that severely curtailed religious expression and controlled religious institutions-at times co-opting and at other times brutally repressing those institutions-with the aim of effecting the demise of religion; an aim which was never fully realized. The post-1991 era was radically different, at least in those newly independent countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Georgia that adopted and implemented liberal laws regarding religious expression and organization. It might be expected that religious leaders and practitioners would have a straightforwardly positive view of this widening scope for religious activities, but this was not always the case, as I explain using two examples from my ethnographic research 5 :
In 2001, the imam of a small town in Ajara, a predominantly Muslim region of Georgia, told me, "During communism we had more freedom; we still had our own lives. Now, we are losing everything. These examples point out that the law is only as effective as its implementation, but they do so in different ways. In the first example we see that the law can become a tool to advance the interests of some religious groups, and in the second example we see a glimpse of the uneven So what was the freedom in repression to which the imam in Ajara (Georgia) alluded?
It is important to point out that he was not referring to the Stalinist repressions of the 1920s and 1930s, decades that were characterized by a rapidly dwindling tolerance for religious institutions and for public religious expression. In Ajara this period had been marked by a heavy-handedly repressed rebellion that had been prompted by the unveiling campaign of 1929, the closure of all 172 madrasas and 158 mosques (except one in the provincial capital Batumi), and the imprisonment of unwilling religious leaders. 8 Rather, the imam was referring to the anti-religious efforts of the 1960s to 1980s that had focused on eradicating the so-called "backward and harmful traditions" by targeting religious holidays and rituals and disseminating atheist and anti-religious ideas through the media and in schools. 9 The combined effect was that "religion" disappeared from much of public life, but the resulting status quo also implied that there was room for religious expression in a more "domesticated" fashion, to use Dragadze's term. 10 Importantly, Moscow's anti-religious line was not always followed in local contexts.
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As is often noted about Muslim regions of the Soviet Union, even local officials (Communist Party members) would sometimes participate in religious events such as circumcision feasts and Islamic funerals. 12 The popular Soviet joke "they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work" could with some justification be adapted as "they pretend to eradicate religion, and we pretend not to practice religion." Put differently, there was more room for religious expression in the late Soviet period than the image of the "totalitarian" USSR tends to project.
Moreover, there is a certain "freedom" in being able to affiliate oneself with a religious tradition without conforming to doctrinal demands. During Soviet times religious affiliation did not always have to be accompanied with other displays of commitment such as fasting, regular prayer, or abstaining from alcohol, because the ban on religion made this either impossible or provided a good excuse not to be bothered. In the words of a villager in Ajara: "[W]e were Muslims, of course, but we could only pray inside our homes. We didn't think badly of anyone who drank at work or offered wine to guests, as those things were simply unavoidable." To understand the context, it is important to remember that Ajara had been part of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, and its inhabitants had converted to Islam during that time. When the region became part of Soviet Georgia (as an Autonomous Republic) its Georgian-speaking inhabitants were classified as Georgians even though their religious affiliation set them apart from other (non-Ajaran) Georgians who were Orthodox
Christians. The Soviet domestication of religion proved useful in the sense that it allowed
Ajarans to continue to be Muslim at home while increasingly becoming secular (Soviet)
Georgians in public. This fragile balance was disrupted when in the 1990s Georgian nationality was framed in Orthodox Christian terms, as part of a process to overcome the Soviet ideological legacy and reconnect with the long historical roots of the imagined Georgian nation. Despite this larger national religious framework, the new situation did bring more freedom to practice Islam openly: new mosques were constructed and madrasas were opened, young men studied abroad at Islamic universities, and elderly people went on hajj.
However, the return of religion to public life made it problematic to be simultaneously
Muslim and Georgian, a conundrum that had the effect of eroding the Muslim community.
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It is within this context that the imam's nostalgia for religious repression makes perfect sense.
These examples are instructive for other Soviet and post-Soviet settings as well, especially those in which ethnic and religious affiliations have been closely intertwined.
Religious freedom tends to increase the expectation that religious affiliation is accompanied by behavior deemed appropriate for that specific faith. During Soviet times, identifying as a people who insisted that they were Muslim because they were of a specific ethnic background, after 1991 newly trained imams complained about the same attitude. For the former, the amalgamation of ethnic and religious affiliation prevented people from becoming true socialists 19 ; for the latter, the problem was that it prevented people from becoming true Muslims.
Moreover, "religious freedom" is more "free" for some than for others. In Ajara the key asymmetry was that Muslims had to compete against a well-funded Orthodox Christian church that was backed by a powerful national discourse according to which Georgians ought to be Christian. Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, many of the "traditional religions" (a term reserved for religions that existed before the Soviet period) felt that they were up against unfair competition against, especially, rich evangelical denominations based in Western
Europe or North America. 20 Conversely, representatives of newly active religious groups felt that they were disadvantaged by the distinction made between "traditional" and "non- traditional" religions, a distinction that was enshrined in many religion laws across the former Soviet Union. 21 It is undeniable that the end of communism dramatically widened the scope for religious activity in the former Soviet states. This has been evidenced by the vibrant construction of mosques and churches, the reappearance of religious symbols in public life, the return of clergy in public positions of various kinds, and the virtual evaporation of atheist ideology. However, the return of religion to the public sphere also brought with it new tensions new constraints. These vary from social pressure to participate in religious activities to new dynamics of exclusion that accompany the politicization of religion: the entanglement of religious and national identities, the sacralisation of secular power, and the impact of the global discourse of (counter-)terrorism. 22 These ironies warn against making simple assumptions about either "repression" or "freedom," and draw attention to how possibilities and impossibilities for religious expression graft onto different social realities.
Contradictions of the Law
The religious freedom guaranteed in the constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan includes the right of every citizen to freely and independently choose his/her relation to religion, to individually or with others profess any religion, or not to profess any, to 21 Alexander Agadjanian, "Revising Pandora' 30 The Tablighi Jamaat, which nowadays is a global movement, has its origins in 1920s India; it focuses on spiritual reformation at the grassroots level. A good source on the movement's history is Marc Gaborieau, "The transformation of Tablighi female) Kyrgyz of Muslim background. 31 The Tablighi Jamaat also became increasingly popular, especially among young urban Kyrgyz men. 32 Such proliferation of religious activity is hardly surprising, but it was not the "religious revival" that the government had desired or anticipated. State functionaries, representatives of the "traditional religions," 33 and segments of the general population 34 saw the religious proliferation and diversification as undermining the national integrity of the country, and creating tensions at the local level. Consider the words of Murzakhalilov, the previously mentioned specialist at the State Agency for Religious Affairs:
The situation is a complex one: on the one hand, there is freedom of conscience; on the other, the need to legally regulate what the religious organizations and missionaries are doing . . . we need new laws . . . to keep within limits those religious organizations that may change the traditional family and clan relations and traditional religious preferences, and upset the religious balance in the republic. 35 It might be tempting to dismiss this statement as revealing a lingering Soviet mentality, including an obsession with control. Even so, the expressed concerns trigger a question: Who benefits from full-stop religious liberalization and with what effects? Proponents of religious liberalization often apply the notion of a "religious market" to stress that-like economic liberalization-it is the best available model not only to stimulate growth, but also to reach equilibrium. Like all markets, however, the "religious market" contains inequalities and asymmetries. 36 In Kyrgyzstan, far-reaching religious liberalization was particularly beneficial to religious groups that had transnational financial connections, a strong mission component, a focus on the individual, and an emphasis on disentangling faith and culture. Moreover, the rapid growth of such groups hardly indicated an emerging "equilibrium" but instead produced social friction at the local level.
In The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Winnifred Sullivan draws attention to the fact that law and religion "speak in languages largely opaque to each other." 37 The key problem is that religious freedom laws require religion to be delimited when it is impossible to draw unambiguous lines between religion and culture, especially with regards to everyday life. In the cases she analyzes, the effect is that "lived religion" remains unprotected or even opposed by the law (hence the title of her book). I agree with Sullivan's argument, but I suggest that apart from leaving lived religion unprotected, the impossibility of delimiting religion may also offer opportunities. Indeed, it partly explains why Soviet authorities were unable to eradicate religion. They aimed to eradicate "religion" while promoting "culture,"
which meant that significant aspects of "lived religion" remained out of sight. 38 Here I make a related argument: the impossibility of delimitation provided room for circumventing the law in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. This is so because sometimes the issue is less about having one's religious activities recognized as religion, and more about having religious activities recognized as non-religion. Evangelical missions were very skilled in producing this blurring 36 Pelkmans, "Asymmetries on the 'Religious Market' in Kyrgyzstan. effect; in doing so they were able to both circumvent the law and avoid the various controversies their presence and activities were likely to produce in a Muslim-majority context.
To appreciate this point it is important to note that although Kyrgyzstan's liberal laws between 1992 and 2008 did offer opportunities for foreign-originating religious activities, the evangelical proselytizing activities among people of Muslim background continued to be controversial. Moreover, foreign "religious workers" had to be registered, and this could be a burdensome and drawn-out process, which could delay mission work by months. One way to avoid both the law and public controversy was to present oneself as a nongovernmental organization. In the early 2000s there were evangelical micro-loan projects, orphanages and centers for street children, cultural nongovernmental organizations promoting "mutual understanding," and even evangelical Internet cafes offering not only the advertised services but also spiritual guidance. Their public appearance was "secular"-and they were registered as such-but evangelizing was central to their work. It might be tempting to see this as "abusing" Kyrgyzstan's liberal environment (as did the state functionary quoted in the introduction), but from the point of view of the missionaries, the essence of being a Christian is to share your faith with others, and hence they saw no problem in mixing humanitarian and spiritual aid. Evangelical missions often remained unseen and unopposed precisely because they skilfully adopted the appearance of the aid industry and were associated with the powerful West. Moreover, the strength of their network-including connections with US diplomats-served as a guard against infringements of their rights by the host government. in the post-9/11 context, Islamic piety movements are far more likely to be seen as a security threat than Christian missions, even in Muslim-majority countries such as Kyrgyzstan. It appears that "religious freedom" is particularly useful to those who fit the freedom picture, are able to mobilize market forces, and can manipulate the law.
As mentioned above, Kyrgyz politicians perceived the religious proliferation as a threat to the collective good. They increasingly bemoaned the "excessively" liberal laws, which they (quite realistically) perceived as having been imposed on the country by international organizations. In response, members of parliament (the Keneş) proposed a series of amendments beginning in the late 1990s. 40 International pressure prevented these initiatives from crystallizing for almost a decade, but in 2008 a new religion law was adopted which outlawed proselytizing and prohibited religious activities that undermined national integrity-an action clearly aimed at the activities of "non-traditional" religions. Religious rights movements and representatives of Evangelical churches protested vehemently. This meant that they received informal protection from local imams as well as the regional senior imams (imam-khatib). Their increasingly prominent position and public acceptance was much more significant than a change in the law, hence their relative indifference to a law that was so vehemently contested by religious rights groups.
As the law became more restrictive and the political situation became more unstable, 43 possibilities for secular authorities to randomly exercise force increased. The
Tablighis were untroubled by the law because they had become integrated into a number of informal orders. However, groups that had not been able to secure such a position-because they were disconnected, disliked, or both-found themselves in an increasingly vulnerable position. The Tablighi quoted in the introduction was correct when asserting that the new law would affect Jehovah's Witnesses, but not them. 
